“They say the momentum of history was ever thus, the empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide.” So states the first line of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. We are used to thinking about Thai politics as divided between two camps. But the momentum of history is pointing to new unions and divisions that are shaping our new political landscape.
Pheu Thai leader Cholanan Srikaew, in an interview, recently explained that the “largest party” in the current parliament is actually the current conservative bloc, composed of 188 votes. Move Forward, on the other hand, has 151 seats, making it the second biggest party, while Pheu Thai has 141, meaning that it is third. He was immediately criticized online for faulty logic — the conservative camp, after all, is composed of several parties. But it perhaps illustrates how Pheu Thai itself views the three-camp nature of Thai politics, and the choice it must make between the other two.
Move Forward and Pheu Thai, after all, was always in an unnatural partnership: an arranged marriage generated by the shared goal of replacing Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, rather than a true synergy of ideology. Aside from the question of whether it can support Prayut, who overthrew the previous Pheu Thai government, the latter party has more in common — both in terms of belief and personnel — with a party like, say, Palang Pracharath, than it does with Move Forward.
That may not necessarily be the view of its supporters, many of whom voted for Pheu Thai out of anti-Prayut sentiment. But from the view of the party’s politicians, who does Pheu Thai find easier to negotiate with: the three men from Palang Pracharath who visited the party’s headquarters on Sunday, all of whom had previously been in Pheu Thai, or a stridently ideological party like Move Forward?
Now, the long-anticipated “political crossover,” sweetened by the sugar of mint-chocolate diplomacy, is finally on the verge of materializing. Not every party that had been to Pheu Thai’s headquarters will end up in a future coalition. But the theatrical proceedings of the past weekend made it clear that Move Forward’s position in the coalition is not tenable, and a government without Move Forward will certainly need more than a few of other parties to make up the numbers.
So what can we say about the grand coalition that now looks more likely than not?
We know what it is against: Move Forward’s proposal to amend Section 112 of the criminal code, also known as the lèse-majesté law. We know remarkably little about what this prospective grand coalition would be for. More of the same, perhaps? Prayut had employed a lot of the same people that Thaksin did, after all. And a return home by Thaksin, which the past Pheu Thai government had unsuccessfuly tried to secure?
The latter would require some remarkable political amnesia. It was a goal that was obstructed, after all, by many of the politicians that had strolled into Pheu Thai’s headquarters on Saturday. Akanat Promphan, a key leader of the protests that stopped Yingluck Shinawatra’s Amnesty Bill, was there; so was Pirapan Salirathavibhaga, who recently quit as MP so that he could be by Prayut’s side “until his very last second as prime minister.”
At the press conference, Pirapan insisted they are not discussing joining a coalition and that they are not yet committing to supporting a Pheu Thai prime minister. But the fact that he would not rule it out is in itself remarkable on its own. Former PDRC members walking into Pheu Thai for discussions would have invited a torrent of criticism from conservatives previously. The reaction from the United Thai Nation base now, however, appears remarkably accepting.
Imagine telling Suthep Thaugsuban, who had railed against Abhisit Vejjajiva in 2019 just for rejecting Prayut, back in 2014 that the party Prayut helped start would end up in this position!
The United Thai Nation Party is not the only party that might bury its hatchet. Bhumjaithai reportedly tanked a previous Palang Prachachon government when Newin Chidchob told Thaksin “it’s over, boss,” but now bygones can be bygones. And if media reports are to be believed, despite not receiving an invitation to Pheu Thai headquarters, several Democrat MPs would be happy to join a Pheu Thai coalition.
It would be electoral suicide — what will remain of a once-proud political institution that compromised its principles once already to join Prayut’s coalition if it then joins hands with its longtime foe Thaksin? — but the political machinations inside the party suggests the unthinkable is no longer out of the realm of possibility.
The underlying logic that underpins all multipolar systems — the enemy of my enemy is my friend — is too alluring for many of these parties to resist. Pheu Thai and the conservative camp may have some disagreements on certain policies and personalities. But they have enough in common to pause their conflict of two decades. Move Forward may have done the impossible, what neither Thaksin nor Prayut could accomplish: spark political reconciliation. Palang Pracharath promised to “move past political conflict”: now, it is happening.
After the color-coded conflicts of the past twenty years, we could be firmly entering a new chapter of Thai politics: where two camps are willing to temporarily put aside their differences against a third. Long divided, perhaps now they will unite.