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Many international observers had high hopes for a significant recalibration of Thailand’s stance towards Myanmar following the 2023 general election. With a civilian-led administration taking over from a military-dominated government, there were high expectations for a departure from the status quo. However, these aspirations were swiftly dashed when the Pheu Thai Party (PTP), emerging as the first runner-up, formed an alliance with two military-aligned parties, Phalang Pracharath (PPRP) and United Thai Nation (UTNP), offering little in terms of substantive change to the electorate.
Meanwhile, civil unrest in Myanmar continues unabated, with skirmishes persisting between ethnic insurgents and the entrenched military junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Even after recent hostilities in April, centered around the southeastern town of Myawaddy, Bangkok maintains its professed neutrality. While it supports Myanmar authorities, such as facilitating the use of Mae Sot international airport for repatriating officials, Bangkok’s primary concern appears to be safeguarding its substantial economic interests, valued at $2.7 billion, within this pivotal cross-border trading enclave.
The furthest stride made by the Srettha administration was the mere establishment of a humanitarian corridor. This suggested that it perceived this action as the limit of its involvement, driven by a reluctance to intrude into Myanmar’s domestic politics. Instead, it deferred to Laos, in its role as ASEAN chair, to spearhead the endeavor towards peace in Myanmar at this juncture.
Here are the reasons behind Thailand’s modest initiatives and somewhat pro-Myanmar junta stance. Firstly, as emphasized in government releases, Myanmar and Thailand share a border spanning over 2,400 kilometers across 10 provinces. This extensive border inadvertently facilitates cross-border movements, leading to occasional influxes of unwelcome visitors from the northwest. While there is a consistent demand for Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, not all border crossers possess the skills sought in the Thai labor market. Thus, labor authorities implement a screening process, restricting entry for those lacking relevant skills, especially beyond designated camps.
Imagine a scenario where Myanmar, under the military junta, loses the civil war. The best-case scenario could see the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) ascend to power after years of dictatorship, potentially evolving into a valued ally of the West. This optimistic prospect resonates with the aspirations of many strategists. Thailand, too, has been nurturing informal ties with select NUG representatives residing within its borders, turning a blind eye even when they organize protests near the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok. However, what if an unforeseen worst-case scenario materializes, one that few strategists have pondered?
Some might have heard a concept called ‘dismembered Russia’. That’s akin to what China fears as its colossal nuclear neighbor teeters on the brink of national integrity decline. The Chinese government’s greatest fear isn’t merely the emergence of a new, supposedly democratic Russia, but the specter of a fractured Russia with an uneven distribution of power, potentially igniting factional warfare and instability. A dismembered Myanmar would present the same headache for Thai authorities. Though Myanmar lacks nuclear prowess, it stands as one of the most diverse nations in Southeast Asia. Should the domestic power equilibrium falter, the NUG may lack the means to rein in other factions or ethnic groups. Geopolitics 101, Thailand tends to maintain close ties with the junta; otherwise, it might have to brace for a significant influx of border crossers from its dearest neighbor.
In practical terms, the notion of non-interference holds little sway, particularly in the dynamic landscape of East and Southeast Asia. Myanmar stands as a battleground for regional powers seeking to expand their influence. China exerts its influence through insurgent groups in the north, while India provides sanctuary for NUG members in the west. Thailand’s reach extends deep into the corridors of power in Naypyidaw and Tatmadaw, given the close-knit nature of the two countries’ military elites. Figures like Senior General Min Aung Hlaing have even fostered close ties, akin to being regarded as an adoptive son to the late General Prem Tinsulanonda. Moreover, on the ground, there’s a critical dynamic: military officials from both sides of the border engage in bilateral official diplomacy, fostering close and effective communication channels continually. It’s virtually inconceivable to suggest that Thailand lacks any sway in shaping the political decision-making of its junta neighbor.
Amid calls for economic sanctions, often championed by the West, there’s a chorus of voices urging Thailand to flex its trade muscles, particularly in the natural gas sector and its position as the third-largest foreign direct investor, valued at $11 billion. Yet the broader landscape should also be brought into consideration. While economic sanctions may seem like a potent and noble tool from the perspectives of the US and EU, recent events in Ukraine paint a different picture. The pressure exerted on Russia by the US and its allies yielded limited results and was easily circumvented by overt support from China and India, both of which opted for discounted products from their rogue ally. Indeed, nobility finds no place in Bangkok’s strategic calculus; rather, it’s the national interest that guides its actions.
Despite the sluggish business environment in Myanmar of late, the decision of numerous international companies to defer their expansion plans doesn’t necessarily indicate a permanent halt in investment activity. Particularly, trade between Thailand and Myanmar remains relatively less affected, given that it primarily relies on transactions conducted in Baht and Kyat. Bangkok’s diplomatic stance therefore reflects the sentiment prevailing in its business circles, where there remains a bullish outlook on Myanmar’s future once stability is reinstated.
Fairly speaking, it’s important to note that Bangkok’s actions shouldn’t be interpreted directly as a mere shift away from concerns regarding human rights and the welfare of Myanmar citizens. On the flip side, Thailand positions itself as a neighboring nation primed to bear the brunt of any retaliation from Myanmar firsthand, unlike distant and isolated entities such as the US. To the Thai foreign policy community, such a course of provoking Myanmar hardly appears the most judicious strategic move. In fact, alternative foreign policy paradigms like postcolonialism and the Global South concept have increasingly shaped the mindset of Asian foreign policy elites over the past decade, encompassing nations such as China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand. Much like India and its counterparts in the Non-Aligned Movement within global politics, Thailand has never aligned itself with the US and EU holy alliance camp from the outset. It still doesn’t belong to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a club of affluent nations, yet.
As noted earlier, Bangkok’s strategic culture is firmly grounded in notions of survival and national interest. Its foreign policy circles, largely conservative in nature, harbor deep-seated fears of being ensnared in proxy conflicts orchestrated by the US and its Western allies, akin to the situation in Ukraine. However, an even graver concern looms on the horizon – the unpredictable landscape of US politics. The US State Department’s inability to guarantee continued aid for Ukraine in the event of Donald Trump’s re-election in 2025 only adds to the uncertainty. For Thailand’s foreign policy establishment, betting on a potential US turn towards isolationism is deemed both risky and implausible. Especially in the current global landscape, where the US no longer reigns supreme as the unchallenged superpower it once was in the 1990s.
The challenge at hand extends beyond the confines of the inward-looking, business-focused administration led by PTP’s Srettha Thavisin and Thaksin Shinawatra’s acolytes. It’s also intertwined with the strategic milieu that restricts Thailand to a role where it can only provide token humanitarian aid and engage in discreet diplomacy. Moreover, Thailand must safeguard its long-term economic interests without the security assurances it once enjoyed from former reliable allies, particularly in the absence of a Cold War-era patron to lean on.
Remaining on this path may not result in immediate consequences for Thailand, as similar approaches are commonplace among many governments in the Global South. Nevertheless, there exists a looming peril of Thailand becoming entrenched in a stagnant status quo, potentially relinquishing its opportunity to take the lead in the region. This could pave the way for competitors such as Indonesia to ascend to prominence within the ASEAN community instead of the old regional star like Thailand.
Written by Pridi Thakur