Listen to this story |
In a bid to rejuvenate its tourism sector following the economic slump induced by COVID-19, Thailand has granted citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) a temporary visa waiver, effective since September 2023. This initiative aims to boost the inflow of Chinese tourists, who constitute a significant portion of Thailand’s tourism market. Additionally, Thailand signed an agreement with China for mutual visa exemption, which came into effect in March 2024. While these measures promise substantial economic benefits, they also raise serious concerns about the potential erosion of Thailand’s national sovereignty and security.
The introduction of visa waivers and exemptions has led to a marked increase in Chinese tourist arrivals. However, this surge is not without its geopolitical ramifications. The Chinese government has a history of leveraging its citizens’ presence abroad to extend its influence and law enforcement reach into other countries. This is particularly evident in the cases of Laos and Cambodia, where Chinese law enforcement agencies have established a significant presence. These developments have not necessarily enhanced public safety in these countries but have instead compromised their sovereignty, with Chinese authorities operating extraterritorially and exerting considerable influence over local governance.
The economic benefits of increased tourism from China are undeniable. The influx of Chinese tourists is expected to bring much-needed revenue to Thailand’s hospitality and service sectors, which have been hard hit by the pandemic. However, these benefits should not come at the expense of Thailand’s national security and sovereignty. Thailand must remain vigilant against potential overreach by the PRC, which could use the pretext of law enforcement cooperation to extend its influence within Thai borders. The presence of Chinese law enforcement agents could facilitate acts of transnational repression, as seen in the PRC’s Operation Fox Hunt. This initiative, ostensibly aimed at combating corruption and criminal activities, has often resulted in the forced repatriation of Chinese nationals abroad, raising serious human rights concerns.
The experiences of Laos and Cambodia serve as cautionary tales for Thailand. Despite the increased presence of Chinese law enforcement agents, these countries have not seen significant improvements in public safety. Instead, they have ceded control over critical security operations to Chinese authorities, indirectly supporting repressive actions and transnational crime. The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone in Laos, for instance, has become a hotspot for illicit activities, including drug trafficking and online scams. These issues are exacerbated by weak local governance and the strategic interests of China in the region.
Several case studies highlight the risks associated with increased Chinese law enforcement presence in Southeast Asia. International human rights attorney Lu Siwei, for example, escaped Chinese authorities only to be captured in Laos and forcibly repatriated to China. This incident drew international condemnation and underscored the risks of Chinese extraterritorial law enforcement activities. Similarly, Gui Minhai, a Swedish national and bookstore owner in Thailand, was kidnapped by Chinese agents and taken to China, where he was imprisoned. This case highlights the potential dangers faced by foreign nationals under the shadow of expanded Chinese influence.
Furthermore, over a decade of joint patrols with Chinese law enforcement along the Mekong River has not curbed criminal activities in the region. Despite the increased presence of Chinese law enforcement agents, the Mekong River remains plagued by crime, including the trafficking of illegal narcotics and human trafficking. These developments raise questions about the effectiveness and intentions behind such cooperation. The case of the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone is particularly illustrative. The zone has emerged as a hotbed for illegal activities, from drug production and trafficking to online gambling and money laundering. These criminal enterprises thrive in an environment of lax or non-existent regulations and take advantage of the region’s multi-jurisdictional character, quickly shifting operations to evade crackdowns.
A coordinated regional response is crucial to tackle these expanding criminal activities effectively. However, such coordination is often lacking due to geopolitical considerations. The Mekong region has become a locus of big-power rivalry, where longstanding U.S. ties with countries like Thailand are being tested by China’s rising influence and regional ambitions. This rivalry has greatly limited cooperation between Western governments and China on transnational crime in the Mekong. China, as the most influential actor in the region, could play a critical role in curtailing illicit activities. However, Beijing’s approach has been selective, often focusing on law enforcement only when its national interests are directly threatened. This selective approach is evident in the crackdown on online gambling and scam operations across Southeast Asia, while other crimes in areas controlled by entities friendly to China are often ignored.
Ideally, the U.S. and China should set aside their geopolitical rivalry to cooperate on combating transnational crime in the Mekong. Such cooperation could encourage greater Chinese participation in initiatives like the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and the Thai operations and intelligence center on transnational organized crime in the Mekong. Enhanced regional collaboration could also focus on addressing the governance and socio-economic factors that allow organized crime to flourish. Programs designed to foster good governance, fight corruption, alleviate poverty, and create jobs are essential to addressing the root causes of transnational crime.
The human cost of transnational crime must also be addressed. Thousands of people from around the world are held against their will and often severely abused in online scam centers in Myanmar, Laos, and elsewhere in the region. These individuals, even if rescued or able to escape, are often held on immigration offenses or charged for crimes they were forced to commit. A more proactive approach from their embassies and a victim-centered approach from the countries where they were held or fled to are needed to support these victims adequately.
Reining in the sprawling illegality along the Mekong will not be easy, but the consequences of allowing these illicit businesses to continue operating unchecked are too great for governments to ignore. Better coordination and a more comprehensive approach to security and governance are necessary to tackle these challenges effectively.
Thailand should learn from the experiences of Laos and Cambodia and remain cautious in its engagement with China. While increased tourism from China can bring significant economic benefits, it should not compromise national sovereignty or security.