When the dust settles on this election and the results are finalized, it may turn out that Pheu Thai and Move Forward are only separated by a few seats and a few thousand votes. However, if PT manages to surpass Move Forward in the final tally, even such a scenario would be a disastrous outcome for the team in red.
To put it simply, the fact that Move Forward and Pheu Thai are neck and neck signifies both a victory for Move Forward Party (MFP) and a failure on the part of Pheu Thai. Let’s not forget that Pheu Thai aligned with Palang Pracharath to change the election rules in favor of larger parties, aiming to diminish MFP’s chances. But that strategy did not succeed.
Now, the question is, where did Pheu Thai fail?
Pheu Thai’s failures (although the term is used loosely here, as PT will likely be either the most popular or second most popular party when all is said and done) can be attributed to three missteps.
The first misstep occurred when rumors emerged that PT would collaborate with the PPRP and Prawit Wongsuwan to form a government. Instead of outright denying the possibility of such an alliance with the PPRP and Prawit, who was the mastermind behind the coup, PT’s leadership hesitated and provided non-denials. Whispers from within the party about secret deals with Prawit persisted, even as polls indicated that it was costing Pheu Thai significant support.
The second misstep becomes evident when looking at the top 20 candidates on Pheu Thai’s party list. Among them are widely unpopular figures like Chalerm Yubamrung, as well as former Palang Pracharath Party stalwarts and ministers such as Suriya Juangroongruangkit, who faced protests when he was a minister under the PPRP-led coalitiont. In an election that serves as a referendum on military-backed rule and Prayut Chan-ocha’s tenure, it poses a significant problem for a pro-democracy party to field one of Prayut’s key ministers as a candidate.
The third misstep ties in with the first and its Pheu Thai’s inability to evolve especially in appealing to newer voters. Pheu Thai’s social media campaign lagged far behind its younger competitor and its lack of presence in the virtual space meant it had a harder time responding to allegation and taking advantage of trends. Poor messaging coupled with social media blindness is partly responsible for Move Forward’s strong showing.
That is not to take anything away from the party in orange.
Move Forward skillfully capitalized on these issues and more by running a campaign driven by ideals, firmly believing that it would be acceptable even if they didn’t win outright and ended up in the opposition. Many within Move Forward did not anticipate this outcome; several MP candidates expressed their willingness to spend another four years in the opposition if it meant remaining true to their ideals.
This approach contrasts sharply with Pheu Thai’s mindset, which was fixated on winning at any cost, either by a significant margin or by joining forces with whoever was available, even if it meant partnering with the devil. Perhaps this was driven by a desire to amend the constitution as quickly as possible or to bring back both former Shinawatra prime ministers to Thailand expeditiously.
Regardless, Pheu Thai must now engage in profound introspection and perhaps acknowledge that the era of patronage politics and the reign of influential families is over. While there is still much that Pheu Thai can accomplish, given the enduring popularity of their brand in the Northeast region, their choices moving forward will determine whether they remain relevant or fade into obscurity.